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Ambiguities of global civil society
L O U I S E  A M O O R E  A N D  PAU L  L A N G L E Y *
Abstract. The concept of an emergent global civil society (GCS), an identifiable public sphere
of voluntary association distinct from the architecture of states and markets, has become
voguish in some approaches to international relations and international political economy,
and in the practices of global governance. This article seeks to reveal the limitations of the
prevailing commonsense framing of GCS. Challenging the idea that we can isolate an
unambiguous GCS sphere, we focus instead on the particular uses of GCS – on the practices
that are shaped in its name. We make a number of interventions to emphasise the conceptual
and political ambiguity of GCS. First, we shift the emphasis from GCS as a bounded ‘non-
governmental’ space to GCS as precisely a means of making global politics governable in
particular ways. Second, we question the assumption of GCS as ‘voluntary association’,
asking what it means for GCS to embody or represent the interests of social groups. Finally,
we raise questions of the image of empowerment through GCS, highlighting the power
relations, tensions and contradictions at the heart of a transformative politics.
As a group of academics debating the conceptual and practical implications of global
civil society (GCS), meeting in rural Wales in late summer 2001, we became acutely
aware of the proximity (and also the disjuncture) of the relationship between our
discussions and the ‘real’ world of global politics.1 The date was September 11th and
questions of power, responsibility, representation, and the inclusions and exclusions
of GCS came tragically to the fore. It is these questions as to the constitutive effects
of the discourse of GCS that we find somewhat neglected in the debate to date. The
concept of an emergent GCS, an identifiable public sphere of voluntary association
distinct from the architecture of states and markets, has become voguish in some
approaches to international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE),
and in the practices of global governance. It is the limitations imposed by such
commonsense framings of GCS that we felt were partially responsible for our
inability to find the means to begin to understand what happened on that day.
In this article, refuting the idea that we can isolate a clearly defined GCS sphere,
we focus instead on the particular uses of the concept of GCS as it is deployed to
legitimate and challenge the discourse and practice of global governance. Sensitive
to what is done in the name of GCS, we are interested in the specific representation
that has enabled neoliberal conceptions of global governance to flourish. Our
interest should not be read as an act of political closure. Rather, it is our intention to
reopen areas of the GCS debate that we feel have been prematurely closed down.
The policy prescriptions and commentaries of the principal international organis-
ations have tended to treat GCS as a neutral category, populated in a pluralistic
fashion by voluntary associations, thereby depoliticising its significance in governing
the global political economy. By contrast, academic discussion in IR/IPE has tended
to assert the transformative potential of GCS, particularly in terms of the capacity
of groups to defy neoliberalism and democratise global governance. As the first part
of this article shows, both positions tend to turn upon a particular representation of
GCS. We characterise this by way of shorthand, thus: GCS as bounded space; GCS
as voluntary associations; and GCS as agent of empowerment/resistance. In high-
lighting this representation, and whilst we are sympathetic to the normative concerns
of many of our IR/IPE colleagues, it is our view that if we are to meaningfully open
up the possibilities of GCS we must recognise the politics involved in the mapping
out of what a GCS might look like. Both the discourse and the practices of GCS
contain contradictions, that is they simultaneously exclude, control and discipline, as
they also hold out the potential for resistance.
In the second part of the article, then, we make a number of interventions that
seek to disrupt commonsense understandings of GCS. First, we shift the emphasis
from GCS as a bounded ‘non-governmental’ and non-market domain to GCS as a
means of making the global political economy governable in particular ways. We see
the discussion of GCS as telling us something significant about contemporary efforts
to manage and transform mechanisms of government. André Drainville’s observ-
ations of ‘the making of a compliant citizenry’,2 coupled with the Foucauldian-
inspired governmentality literature, serve to challenge the delineation of civil society
from state and market on which neoliberal global governance programmes rest.
Second, we question the tendency to define GCS as a bounded, coherent sphere of
agency. Most accounts of GCS seem overly tempted to list institutions and actors –
trade unions, church groups, women’s associations and so on – that are assumed to
constitute a coherent force for ‘good’. By contrast, we ask what it means for GCS to
be ‘representative’ of particular interests. In our view, such institutional conceptions
of GCS deny the unbounded, fluid and mobile character of the everyday struggles
that a politicised reading of GCS would need to acknowledge. Finally, we raise
questions of the image of empowerment through GCS that has accompanied the
global governance debates. Following a diverse literature that warns of the ‘inequality
and domination’ that has been ‘built into the concept of “civil society” from the
start’,3 we are concerned with the exclusions and oppressions ‘inscribed in civil
society’.4 In sum, our intervention does not lead us to reject the potential for a
transformative GCS that our IR/IPE colleagues are apt to identify. Rather, we see
the power relations that find expression in the governing of the global political
economy, and the tensions and contradictions of an emergent GCS (and not the
consensus and interdependencies), to be central to the politics of transformation.
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Reflections on the global civil society discourse
The key contextual assumption that underpins the GCS discourse is that we are
witnessing, alongside economic globalisation and the end of the Cold War, the
construction of ‘a nascent global polity’ that ‘is already partly extant, yet remains
mostly emergent’.5 According to this view, it would appear that we have entered a
process of ‘becoming’ in the global political economy. The international politics of
sovereign states is held to be increasingly challenged in juridical and practical terms
by the transnationalising and deterritorialised character of contemporary social
relations.6 Such restructuring has given rise to a range of concepts, often devised in
relation to well-worn notions, that seek to characterise and bring meaning to change.
Scholars in IR/IPE, for example, talk of a ‘post-Westphalian’ politics or a ‘new
medievalism’.7 It is the concept of ‘global governance’ that has, however, become the
most prominent in accounts and policy prescriptions of the decentred, multilayered
and overlapping character of contemporary political authority.8 State institutions
increasingly engage in multilateral agreements (regional and international), and
international organisations such as the G-7, OECD, World Bank, IMF and WTO
take on an expanded importance. Meanwhile, a wide array of ‘private’ institutions
including industrial and financial associations and professional ‘experts’ such as
accountants, consultants and economists also come to exercise significant authority.9
With such proclaimed global governance has come a sharp growth in the activities of
so-called non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that include the likes of Oxfam,
Save the Children and the Red Crescent. While forging close working relationships
with international organisations to, for example, run the refugee camps and design
and carry out development projects, NGOs and broader social movements have also
mobilised in an attempt to shape international policies and challenge the social
relations of the status quo.10 It is this enormously diverse array of NGOs and social
movements that tends to be the focus in a discourse of GCS that has become
ubiquitous in the discussions and practices of global governance.
While we are sympathetic to the desire to map the contours of this global trans-
formation, we are concerned to acknowledge that the ways in which we understand,
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frame and discuss GCS shape what it will or can become. Our purpose would
contrast with that of Colás, for example, for whom the importance of the concept of
‘civil society’ lies in its explanatory utility, ‘the most adequate way of exploring the
role of collective agency in international relations’.11 Grounded in an awareness of
the constitutive effects of the meanings ascribed to GCS, then, we are interested in
the ways in which the inseparable normative and descriptive aspects of the GCS
discourse impinge upon our collective capacity to understand and challenge the
contemporary global political economy.
GCS as bounded space
Representatives of international organisations and academic commentators on
world order tend to share the ideal-typical representation of GCS as an identifiable
space, sphere, realm or ‘third system’,12 bounded by and differentiated from states
and governance on the one hand and economy on the other. As a consequence, GCS
takes on a non-economic and, especially significant for us, a non-governmental set of
characteristics.
In a statement that is representative of the discursive practices of the inter-
national organisations, the World Bank describes civil society as ‘the arena in which
people come together to pursue the interests they hold in common – not for profit or
the exercise of political power, but because they care enough about something to
take collective action’.13 Meanwhile many in the academic community share a very
similar spatial assumption. For instance, the first of Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor’s
three propositions for the study of GCS is that ‘What we can observe in the 1990s is
the emergence of a supranational sphere of social and political participation’.14 Not
only is this sphere distinct from the practices of governance and economy, but they
depict it as existing ‘above and beyond national, regional, or local societies’. Falk
concurs, casting GCS as a ‘field of action’ that provides ‘an alternative ideological
and political space to that currently occupied by market-orientated and statist
outlooks’.15 It is this vision of GCS as a ‘solidarity sphere’16, and its associated
normative undertones of progressive transformation through collective association
that, by and large, distinguishes academic commentaries from those of the inter-
national organisations. As activists in Asia, Latin America and particularly Eastern
Europe recognised during the 1970s and 1980s, ‘the ideal of societal space, autono-
mous from the state, wherein self-management and democracy could be worked
out’17 is of considerable utility to those seeking social transformation.
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The representation of GCS as a bounded space filled with particular non-
governmental and non-economic characteristics draws in large part on the long
history of theories of civil society. Given the undoubted influence of neoliberal
economics and the ideals of liberal democracy in the contemporary global political
economy, it is not surprising that liberal conceptions of civil society have also once
again proved powerful.18 International organisations such as the World Bank have
been very much at the heart of propagating the neoliberal Washington consensus.
Spatial metaphors were strong in the early liberal vision of civil society associated
with Smith and Hegel, a realm for the pursuit of particular interests that could be
distinguished from the universality embodied by the state. Later the divorce of a
liberal civil society of collective associations from the private sphere became central
to the development of capitalism and modernity.19 Meanwhile, the Gramscian
conception of civil society has proved especially influential, both explicitly and
implicitly, amongst activists and academics of GCS. For Gramsci, civil society was
distinct from the economic base and distinguishable from the state, characterised as
‘the realm in which the existing social order is grounded’ and in which resides ‘the
combination of forces upon which the support for a new state and a new order can
be built’.20 That alternative theories of civil society tend to inform the different views
of international organisations and the academic community has, however, done little
to raise question-marks over the portrayal of GCS as bounded space.
The use of spatial metaphors to discern the contours of GCS is clearly not as
unproblematic as common sense would suggest. As Hegel and those writing in the
tradition of historical materialism would wish to remind us, the construction of
GCS as a bounded sphere obscures the extent to which civil society, economy and
state (and other institutions of governance) are necessarily intertwined and mutually
constituting.21 As Keane is at pains to stress, GCS is in many ways ‘overdetermined’
by wider sets of forces.22 The state and other institutions of governance in particular
provide the political and legal framework that institutionalises civil society’s
normative prerequisites. As such it is the broadly liberal form taken by state-
societies, so central to modern political economy, that by advancing and protecting
basic rights has historically filled European civil society with much of its meaning.
Put another way and in the terms of the great traditions of civil society, ‘liberalism
cannot work without republicanism, the public remaking of the private’.23 In turn,
civil associations typically focus on the state to achieve change or resist state policies
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that violate rights.24 This is expressed in the work of scholars such as Murphy and
Colás who, stressing the historical inseparability of state and civil society, reject the
‘global’ signifier in favour of the category of ‘international civil society’.25
Bracketing out contemporary GCS as a bounded sphere may obscure, then, the need
to consider the practices of GCS in close relation to economic change, and the
restructuring of states as part of shifting configurations of governance. It follows
that GCS cannot simply be characterised as containing a particular ‘logic’ of more
or less transformative collective association, differentiated from the ‘logic’ of govern-
ment and authority on the one hand and that of economy on the other. As
Chandhoke has it, ‘we can suggest with some justification that the much-vaunted
autonomy of civil society is constrained from the word go’.26
GCS as voluntary associations
The second tenet of the GCS discourse upon which we would like to reflect is the
tendency to equate GCS with the practices of voluntary associations. In short, GCS
becomes defined as voluntary association and vice versa. Descriptions of GCS in
both the documentation of the international organisations and scholarly work often
read like a ‘who’s who’ of NGOs and social movements, such that GCS becomes
equivalent to what Pasha and Blaney call ‘transnational associational life’.27 Further-
more, the associational life of GCS also becomes privileged in normative terms.
Voluntary associations in the space of GCS are viewed either as the legitimate form
of politics through which to bring improved accountability to the institutions of
global governance, or as the principal form of a progressive politics capable of
challenging and transforming the status quo. What concerns us, then, is the delimit-
ing consequences for politics of framing GCS as voluntary associations.
The common sense that equates GCS with voluntary associations is so omni-
present in the discourse that a couple of illustrative quotations should suffice. For
instance, for the Commission on Global Governance, the term GCS 
. . . covers a multitude of institutions, voluntary associations and networks – women’s groups,
trade unions, chambers of commerce, farming or housing co-operatives, neighbourhood
watch associations, religion-based organizations, and so on.28
Such is the extent of the identification of GCS with voluntary organisations for the
World Bank that they consistently refer to what they call ‘civil society organis-
ations’.29 Meanwhile, despite developing a more critical approach to GCS, leading
IR/IPE scholar of GCS Jan Aart Scholte engages in a not-dissimilar list-making
exercise that suggests that:
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we can take ‘civil society’ to refer to those activities by voluntary associations to shape
policies, norms and/or deeper social structures. Civil society is therefore distinct from both
official and commercial circles … civil society groups include academic institutes, community-
based organisations, consumer protection bodies, criminal syndicates, development
cooperation groups, environmental campaigns, ethnic lobbies, charitable foundations,
farmers’ groups, human rights advocates, labour unions, relief organisations, peace activists,
professional bodies, religious institutions, women’s networks, youth campaigns and more.30
As is the case with the tendency to represent GCS as a bounded space, the image
of GCS as voluntary associations is not simply a consequence of attempts to merely
describe changes in the global political economy. Rather, it is, at least in part, a
reflection of the influence of particular theories of civil society in framing
contemporary conceptions. The ideas expressed in the nineteenth century by Alexis
de Tocqueville on the workings of American democracy clearly loom large. For the
international organisations in particular, de Tocqueville’s conclusions as to the
centrality of voluntary associations to a healthy liberal democracy are by and large
transposed to the present in their policy prescriptions. This is as apparent, for
instance, in the World Bank’s recommendations that assert the centrality of the
‘social capital’ supplied by civil society to economic development,31 as it is in the
WTO’s efforts to welcome the lobbying of NGOs.32 At the same time, the intel-
lectual currents of thought that frame many academic accounts of GCS also
encourage the representation of GCS as voluntary associations. It is far from
coincidental that academic interest in GCS has overlapped with a period of
constructive critical engagement with Marxism across the social sciences.33 The
resulting neo-Marxism is apt to stress that ‘the politics of civil society, articulated
primarily through new social movements, has superseded the politics of class’.34
Civil society is no longer viewed simply as synonymous with bourgeois capitalism,35
but is necessary to either bring capitalism under democratic control or to find a
more democratic means of economic organisation.36 The writings of Gramsci who,
contrary to Marx, was never willing to equate civil society with the bourgeoisie and
instead chose to emphasise a wide range of collective associations, have once again
proved especially influential in this regard.
It is important to reinforce that for both the international organisations and
academic commentators, GCS as voluntary associations is regarded as a force for
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good. While understanding the utility of a well-developed civil society to the
international organisations is fairly obvious given their neoliberal credentials and
prescriptions, we have to turn to debates about the continuing relevance of Marxist
thought to understand the celebration of the virtues of GCS in academic circles.
Just as the proletariat is juxtaposed to the bourgeoisie under Marxism, many
scholars of GCS position the ‘good’ of civil society against the ‘bad’ of state and
capital.37 Such is this trait in the discourse, also influenced by the experience of
activists during the 1980s in Eastern Europe, that GCS as voluntary association is
enclosed further. For many of the leading IR/IPE scholars, GCS no longer refers to
the bourgeoisie or even includes chambers of commerce and other associations of
capital.38 Rather, the space of GCS is an exclusive one, occupied by the associations
and movements of labour, women, environmentalists and other ‘good’ causes. As
Cox claims, ‘The concept has been appropriated by those who foresee an emancip-
atory role for civil society’.39
There is, then, a strong contested normative dimension to GCS as voluntary
associations. The politics of world order is effectively fixed, with the associations of
civil society privileged in different ways from both the ‘top-down’ and from the
‘bottom-up’.40 From what is described as the ‘top-down’, the voluntary associations of
GCS form the focal point upon which turns the vision of a global polity painted and
practised by the international organisations.41 Voluntary associations here are in many
ways the signature of a civility that is brought to bear in global politics, resting upon
the principles of rights, plurality, legality, autonomy and freedom of association.
Echoes of the liberal tradition of civil society are clear. The manner in which GCS as
voluntary associations comes at once to legitimate and delegitimate different forms of
politics in the contemporary global political economy is beginning to be recognised.
For instance, for Pasha and Blaney the ‘notions of civility that are increasingly
attached to civil society, while enabling a certain form of civil life, also contribute to a
narrowing of the political agenda and the exclusion of certain actors and voices’.42
Meanwhile, for Drainville, ‘politics takes on the appearance of a collection of
managerial problems to be solved and where the broad political attempt to settle a
new order goes unexamined’.43 What has been less well recognised to date is that by
advocating the centrality of the ‘good’ voluntary associations of GCS as the key agent
for transformation, the so-called ‘bottom-up’ vision of a progressive global politics
also has delimiting consequences. The coherence of ‘good’ voluntary associations is
assumed and the actual and potential importance of other forms of political practice
are at best obscured, and at worst devalued. For instance, social movements can be
seen to have ‘‘‘dual faces” which dialectically combine instrumental . . . demands with
an expressive dimension orientated towards norms, values, identities, lifestyles, etc.’.44
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The privileging of GCS as a space of voluntary associations risks overvaluing
instrumental political practices to the overall detriment of the progressive politics of
transformation.
GCS as agent of empowerment/resistance
For both its top-down and bottom-up proponents, the medley of voluntary move-
ments and organisations in GCS are, taken together, imagined as ‘an autonomous
and unambiguous agent’.45 The autonomy of GCS rests upon the bounding of a
space of voluntary associations from states and other institutions of governance on
the one hand, and economy on the other. For Kaldor, for example, the defining
feature of ‘21st century’ civil society is its ‘transnational autonomy’ from the war-
making capabilities of the state.46 The unambiguous qualities of GCS arise from the
tendency, present in both the documents of international organisations and the
writings of academic commentators, to represent the voluntary associations of GCS
as a force for good. Here we reflect in detail, then, on the tenet of the discourse
which suggests that GCS constitutes a ‘good’ agent for either empowerment or
resistance. We are, in particular, concerned that GCS as agent of empowerment/
resistance overplays the consensual and coherent characteristics of GCS to the
neglect of power relations, contradictions and tensions.
GCS constitutes an agent for empowerment in a dual sense, enabling the political
participation of GCS whilst authorising and legitimating the practices of the formal
institutions of global governance. Perhaps not surprisingly, international
organisations themselves are keen to invoke the assumed empowerment qualities of
GCS. For example, the 1996 WTO Guidelines for arrangements on relations with
NGOs clearly states that ‘Members recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the
awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree in this regard to
improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs’.47 Meanwhile, the
UN’s actions under the so-called Global Compact have sought to encourage
corporate social and environmental self-regulatory ‘good practice’ through a process
of partnerships that includes major NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund,
Amnesty International and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.48
As the representatives of international organisations appear well aware, a nascent
global polity necessarily entails not only the erosion of state sovereignty but also
challenges the efficacy of liberal democracy.49 They have effectively come to confront
a set of questions reminiscent of those asked by Machiavelli back in the sixteenth
century – that is, how to forge the social basis necessary for new forms of political
authority.
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The conclusion that the voluntary associations of GCS, and not Machiavelli’s
Prince, should play the key role in empowerment has, however, not only been
reached by the international organisations. While often critical of the unaccount-
ability of the institutions of global governance, many in the academic community
have also asserted the centrality of GCS to the making of a democratic global
polity. The international campaigns and lobbying of an NGO like Greenpeace come
to be seen as the exemplar of the democratising potential of GCS.50 In the first
instance the key task for the agent of GCS is ‘about increasing the responsiveness of
political institutions . . . the need to influence and put pressure on global institutions
in order to reclaim control over local political space’.51 As Scholte notes:
civil society activities can contribute to a democratic legitimation of the governance of
globalization. Authority is legitimate when stakeholders feel that governors have a right to
govern over them and that they, as citizens, have a duty to submit to the established rules.
There has been limited legitimacy in the governance of globalization to date. Most people
have accepted most policies towards global relations with passivity, ignorance and
resignation. Yet if civil society offers stakeholders civic education, opportunities to speak, and
chances to debate options, then people can begin to feel that they ‘own’ global politics and
positively endorse its outputs. Such legitimacy not only renders governance more democratic;
it also tends to make policies more viable.52
For many academic commentators, the capacity of GCS to successfully and meaning-
fully empower the institutions of global governance requires that new forms of
democratic participation are put in place. To return to Anheier et al., GCS is also
‘about the radicalisation of democracy and the redistribution of political power’.53
Richard Falk talks, for instance, of the need to construct what he terms ‘normative
democracy’. With clear parallels to David Held’s work, Falk conceives of democracy
‘as extending beyond constitutional and free, periodic elections to include an array
of other assurances that governance is orientated toward human wellbeing and
ecological sustainability, and that citizens have access to arenas of decision’.54
It can be seen, then, that implicit in much of the academic advocacy of GCS is
the belief that by acting as a progressive force for ‘good’, GCS provides the key to
resistance in the contemporary world order. While for the likes of Richard Falk this
resistance hinges upon the establishment of more participatory and substantive
democratic arrangements, others expect GCS to take the lead in a wider and perhaps
ultimately more emancipatory transformation. In the Gramscian terms of many of
these writers, civil society’s organic intellectuals, including academics, church leaders,
trade unionists, environmentalists, social activists and leaders of community organis-
ations, are enacting a so-called counter-hegemonic war of position to establish a
‘higher form of society’.55 Whilst uncertain and far from determined, the qualities of
such a society seem likely to combine equitable and environmentally sustainable
economic provisioning with a republican vision of democracy.
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For us, however, the representation of GCS as the ‘good’ agent for empowerment/
resistance remains highly problematic. Our concerns go beyond the observations of
advocates of GCS that achievements have been ‘piecemeal’ and ‘disparate’ to date,56
or that in the emancipatory sense GCS remains ‘something to be achieved’.57 Rather,
we would seek to raise questions as to the coherent and consensual features of GCS
that, as a prerequisite for empowerment/resistance, tend to be assumed. For us, civil
society is constituted as much by the highly differentiated politics of power as it is by
the politics of empowerment and protest. Inequalities and conflicts abound. For
instance, we should recognise that the overtly neoliberal vision of GCS propagated
by the international organisations ‘is established after the image of the civilised
(European) male individual’ and ‘rests on a foundation of excluded women, who are
expected to live under conditions of household despotism’.58 At the same time, the
capacity of the voluntary associations of GCS to empower the formal institutions of
global governance itself requires the prior provision and protection of basic rights of
association that remain far from universal or pluralist. By way of example, Anheier
et al. draw our attention to fault lines in GCS between those that support or wish to
reform, reject or find alternatives to globalisation.59 The liberal constitution of GCS,
as currently practised by the international organisations, structurally privileges
supporters of globalisation and, at best, those NGOs seeking reform.
Serious doubts also remain as to the representation of GCS as a ‘good’ agent for
resistance. As already noted, the ‘good’ character of GCS is initially established by
banishing the associations of capital from the space of civil society, such that GCS
becomes ‘something like a world proletariat in civvies’.60 This contrasts with the
current situation in which the engagement between international organisations and
voluntary associations is by and large dominated by capital.61 Even if we can accept
that the associations of capital are not part of an emancipatory GCS, questions still
remain as to the assumed consensus amongst labour, environmentalists, women’s
groups and so on. This ‘good’ consensus, perceived to reflect a common opposition
to neoliberalism, is far from assured. As Cox admits, a lack of consensus could leave
the way clear for what he calls the ‘dark forces’ of the extreme right, terrorists,
organised crime and the intelligence services to enjoy further ‘covert power’.62 In
sum, we would contend that the representation of GCS as actual and potential agent
of resistance may actually divert our attention from the very power relations that we
would seek to explore and question.
Global civil society reconsidered
In the first section of this article we have explored what we consider to be the
dominant mode of knowledge in the contemporary framing of GCS. By positioning
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GCS as a non-governmental and non-market domain, constituted through voluntary
association and resulting in an empowering and progressive force for good, this
representation tells us ‘what GCS is’ and, importantly, what it is not. Given IR/IPE’s
predilection for identifiable and bounded agents within clearly defined structures of
power, the more subtle and contradictory voices and actions of other groups have
often become obscured.63 Our purpose in this section is to begin to draw together
from diverse sources an alternative framing of GCS. The different strands of inquiry
explored here have in common an emphasis on power and, specifically, on the
intricate and intractable relationship between power and knowledge. Our knowledge
of what GCS may constitute is understood to be inseparable from the power that is
exercised through the framing of, for example, mechanisms of global governance. To
think differently about the existence of a GCS, then, is to open up the possibility for
alternative forms of politics. Drawing on a number of concrete examples of what we
may call civil society practices, we intend to show that such alternative forms of
politics are, indeed, already present, though obscured from view by the search for a
particular kind of responsible and ‘civil’ global agency.
From a non-governmental space to a means of governing
The orthodox understanding of GCS, as we have suggested in this article, embodies
a particular view of what it means ‘to govern’ and ‘to be governed’. Government is a
function that is held to rest with formal institutions – governments, international
organisations and so on. James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel’s established
argument that world affairs have shifted from a system of government to governance
retains the notion that to govern is to provide the institutionalised norms and
frameworks for action.64 A GCS, then, is necessary to provide accountability in a
system of global governance. As a so-called third sphere of non-governmental
politics, GCS is celebrated because it is seen as outside government. We wish to
bring our concern with power relations to front and centre by reconsidering GCS as
precisely a site of government – as a place where the global political economy is
shaped, regulated or deregulated, disciplined or sustained. In this alternative framing
of GCS as a discursive means of governing, of making people and their actions
governable, we find the potential to challenge ascribed boundaries of state/civil
society and public/private, and to highlight the ambiguities of GCS. If we are to
meaningfully open up the possibilities of a transformative GCS we must recognise
that it simultaneously holds out the potential for resistance, while it closes down,
excludes, controls and disciplines.
Michel Foucault’s writing offers us a conception of government and governability
that refutes conventionally held dichotomising assumptions about state and civil
society. Governmentality, as he termed it, is ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions,
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procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target
population’.65 The act of government, then, is not something undertaken by institu-
tions and individuals holding power over society. Rather, governmentality permits
government from a distance, just as the global governance doctrines prescribe.
Commenting on the relevance of Foucault’s work to what he calls ‘neoliberal
subjects’, Nikolas Rose depicts the kind of government that can exist through the
mentalities of individuals and groups:
An enabling state that will govern without governing ‘society’ – governing by acting on the
choices and self-steering properties of individuals, families, communities, organizations. This
entails a twin process of autonomization plus responsibilization – opening free space for the
choices of individual actors whilst enwrapping these autonomized actors within new forms of
control .66
The implications of the governmentality thesis for the contemporary discourse of
GCS are, in our view, of great significance. For instance, in his Foucauldian study of
civil society associations in the UK, John Morison uncovers a ‘new breed of
professionalized, well-funded, and well-organized voluntary associations’ who ‘use
the language of risk and reward, choice, economic rationality, targeting and output
as the governing concepts’.67 Focusing similar attention on transnational civil society,
André Drainville points to the ‘double attempt to construct global civil society and
settle with it the terms of transnational civility’.68 Exploring what he terms ‘trans-
national subjects’ through the Quebec City protests of 2001, he understands the
twinning of heads of states’ Summits and People’s Summits as an ‘attempt to create
a responsible hemispheric civil society’ within which resistance becomes compliance.69
Under orthodox neoliberal conceptions of GCS as a bounded non-governmental
public space, most personal questions of how one should live and who one should
aspire to be are deemed to be private and are effectively depoliticised. The
governmentality lens on GCS has the effect of repoliticising private individual
ambitions, perceptions and experiences as these are brought into networks of power.
The membership of an environmental group, for example, becomes tied to the
citizen as a responsible consumer and draws on numerous lifestyle habits and
choices – from fair-trade cappuccinos to ‘anti-sweatshop’ T-shirts.
The practices of global civil society, it seems to us, cannot be decisively situated in
a bounded space that is ‘non-governmental’ and ‘non-economic’. In the World
Bank’s framing of civil society, for example, local networks and voluntary associ-
ations become a means to mitigate the more damaging forces of the global economy.
Under the heading ‘what is civil society?’, their website represents voluntary
associations as sources of social capital that can, alongside state and market,
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‘contribute jointly to the provision of welfare and economic development’.70 Offering
the examples of local credit networks and rural organisations, the concept of civil
society is tied to the responsibilities of individuals and groups to take ‘the oppor-
tunity to participate’ in development and social welfare. In the World Development
Report Attacking Poverty, the Bank makes its use of GCS as a means of governing
more explicit. In their guidelines on ‘helping poor people to manage risk’ they
describe microfinance as a ‘risk management tool’ that can ‘help poor households
smooth consumption during an adverse shock’.71 Though the report refers to NGOs
such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), HomeNet, and Women in
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), the participation of
these groups is understood to be the responsible and proactive obligation of global
citizens. The critical voices that these groups bring to the inequalities of the global
economy are masked by a discourse of ‘harnessing global forces’ and providing
channels for legitimate participation that enable poor people to ‘get the best’ from
globalisation.
We are not suggesting that GCS is simply synonymous with the governing of the
latest (neoliberal, global) stage of bourgeois capitalism, far from it. Rather, spaces of
GCS should be treated as ambiguous, open to contestation and often contradictory.
The roles of civil society groups in relation to the governance of the global political
economy are, more often than not, undecidable. Organisations may simultaneously
appear to offer coping mechanisms for dealing with globalisation (in effect, plugging
the gaps left by the global economy), while also offering a substantive critique of the
structures of global finance and production. Indeed, NGOs may themselves debate
and negotiate the terms of their role in advocacy networks and partnerships,
acknowledging the tensions and contradictions in their own activities to such an extent
that their intra-institutional organisation divorces their role in service-delivery from
their advocacy work.72 A further example can be found in local exchange trading
systems (LETS). On the one hand, LETS are widely understood to be voluntary
associations that have emerged as a response to the exclusionary consequences of
financial globalisation.73 Yet, on the other hand, their relationship to the politics of
global financial exclusion is thoroughly ambiguous. In one sense, they are ‘self help’
associations that also campaign for change in global finance. In another sense, the
practices of LETS appeal to criteria of trust and responsibility that are not dissimilar
from those applied to individuals by mainstream financial institutions. While we agree
that LETS are interesting and potentially transformative sites within specific locales,
we also emphasise their ambivalence – they cannot be isolated from state, market, or
the existing exclusions of mainstream finance. For us, the contested and contradictory
making of neoliberal or transnational subjectivities, furthered by the global gover-
nance discourse, is part of a wider network of production, consumption and familial
practices that criss-cross ascribed public and private domains.
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From fixed agency to the politics of movement
‘Terms like “international civil society”’, writes Arjun Appadurai, ‘do not entirely
capture the mobility and malleability of those creative forms of social life that are
localized transit points for mobile global forms of civic and civil life’.74 As a concept
used to explain the emergent character of contemporary global politics, GCS has
done much to transcend the state-centred preoccupations of much IR and IPE. Yet,
many of the habits of traditional IR/IPE inquiry remain in place: the tendency to
look for identifiable and atomised agents, a focus on institutions as fixed structures
of political life, and the separation of levels of analysis as though these were actually
clearly delineated in everyday life. In some senses the concept of a GCS always
appears in relation to a sovereign state or international organisation,75 a named list
of institutions with clear membership constituencies, and a spectrum of activity
from ‘transnational’ to ‘grassroots’. For Rob Walker, ‘social movements are, to the
modern political imagination, most easily fixed within a sphere of social life that is
distinguished from and even counterposed to the sphere of politics – within the so-
called civil society’.76 Taken together with Appadurai’s observations, this suggests
not that we take our eyes off civil society movements or necessarily deny the
potential of a transformative GCS, but that we think of them as unbounded, fluid,
and mobile political sites. In contrast to fixed and named associations, we then see a
sphere of social life whose boundaries and membership are contested. Rather than
an elite world of policymaking that is counterposed to local and grassroots struggle,
we see what Walker terms ‘the transgression of these fine lines’.77 The politics of
movements thus shifts from the identification of a fixed association or NGO to an
acknowledgement of the ability to confound boundaries that is their very essence.
It is not unusual for an institution or organisation to claim to be speaking on
behalf of, or with the mandate of, GCS. To explore an example, there is increasing
interest in the idea that organised labour may be, in the broadest sense, represent-
ative of the interests of civil society. Juan Somavia, Director General of the ILO,
considers organised labour to be an institution of GCS, with transnational unions
being ‘the most organised actors and the most articulate voices in society’.78 It is
held that the challenges posed to labour by globalisation and the restructuring of
production are shared by civil society more widely, and that the trade unions
represent the most effective channel for communicating those interests. Put simply,
effective politics is understood to reside with formalised associations that have a
clear mandate. Alliances between trade unions and NGOs have been celebrated by a
literature that documents the rise of a ‘global social movement unionism’ that
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transcends the narrow concerns of organised labour.79 This tendency to name
associations or movements as vehicles for GCS serves to fix the politics of work and
labour as something that is the preserve of trade unions and NGOs. The experiences
of unprotected workers, or indeed the unemployed, are exposed only via inter-
mediary agencies that claim to speak on their behalf.
If we reconsider the agency of workers and worker groups, focusing on the
mobile and contested nature of movements, we can begin to problematise the idea
that formalised trade unions speak on behalf of workers as a collective body. The
contemporary politics of movement within and across workplaces is as much about
‘involuntary’ and unplanned ‘reflex’ action, what James Scott would call ‘infra-
politics’,80 as it is ‘voluntary’ and strategic action. Many of the struggles labelled
‘grassroots’, such as plant-level industrial action or everyday ‘footdragging’ and acts
of disruption, are actually central to the politics of work and confound attempts to
limit this to a global social movement unionism. Maria Soldatenko’s studies of
Latina garment workers in Los Angeles, for example, emphasise the intra-worker
and inter-ethnic conflict within sweatshop conditions. This problematises the
treatment of workers as a collective body and exposes the difficulties of trying to
‘forge an effective culture of resistance’.81 It is not to say that collective identities
and resistances cannot emerge in such environments, but rather to highlight the
shifts and political struggles that define the nature of the resistance. To illustrate
further, in Bread and Roses, Ken Loach’s cinematic portrayal of life as an
undocumented Mexican cleaner in Los Angeles, Rosa voices her contempt for the
American unions that claim to represent her interests. Supporting her family
through prostitution and cleaning work, she asks her white, college-educated union
representative, ‘what do you risk?’, challenging his ‘justice for janitors’ campaign
with an appeal for ‘justice for Rosa’. In response to the union’s collective ‘we’, Rosa
replies ‘don’t say we, there is never we, only I’.82 Again, we do not suggest the
impossibility of multiple ‘I’s’ becoming ‘we’, and indeed Loach’s film reveals this
possibility. Rather, we wish both to expose the problem of ascribing ‘responsible’
and ‘civil’ identities to people by virtue of their exclusion, and to acknowledge the
tensions and personal losses that accompany the making of solidarity.
When labour organisations claim to speak on behalf of a collective ‘we’ they avert
their gaze, not only from the experiences of workers at the margins of the global
political economy, but also from the ‘silent resistances’ that characterise the politics
of displaced and excluded peoples.83 Beneath the surface of an emergent GCS lie
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multiple global civil societies with competing experiences of what it means to belong
to a group or place, what it means to organise, and what it means to say ‘we’.
Uncovering the power in empowerment
In most orthodox accounts of GCS as agent of empowerment, power is considered
to be a commodity that is parcelled up, held by particular agents and groups, and
wielded over the lives of others. ‘The capacity to wield power as a resource over
other agents’, writes David Campbell, ‘is an important proviso of agency’.84
The voluntary associations assumed to populate a fledgling GCS, then, can be
‘empowered’, literally endowed with the power resources necessary to apply pressure
for global transformation. The problem, of course, is that things are rarely so
straightforward in the concrete practices of organisation and resistance. It is not
possible to reduce power to a named group, institution or actor, as many seeking to
map out a GCS would wish to do. Civil society groups or movements do not simply
‘rise up’ to challenge the power of global markets, they do not unambiguously resist
because they are always also intricately involved in the very production of that
power:
Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed
with; it is the name one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular
society.85
Our attention is directed to the ways in which power functions and is exercised
through civil society groups, and to the inequalities and exclusions that are
produced. As collective agents, global civil society networks are themselves inscribed
with the power relations found in the states, markets, and organisations they seek to
challenge. We would agree, then, with John MacLean who reminds us that to reduce
our search for transformative ‘agency’ to the identification of collective ‘agents’ leads
to a misrepresentation of politics and power relations.86 Trade unions, universities,
the media, and church organisations are all historical sites of civil society uprising,
but they are simultaneously spaces of representation, exclusion and control. The
politics of GCS is, thus, running with contradictions, and constantly in flux – a
movement that is not always in the direction of emancipatory ‘civility’.
We wish to emphasise here three aspects of GCS that become visible if we cease
the search for the consolidated agent for ‘good’ and recognise the agitative and
contradictory nature of what it means to be ‘civil’. First, within a named and
assumed civil society grouping there are tensions surrounding ‘who’ is being
empowered, or ‘what’ is being resisted. To deny these tensions in a search for a
single galvanising manifesto or agenda is to miss the very heart of the politics of
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transformation. In his discussion of the popular dissent leading to the East
German revolution, Roland Bleiker significantly problematises the image of a civil
society movement that empowers its members and rewards their participation:
Despite their unusually active participation in the protest movement, East German women
suffered disproportionately from the subsequent process of unification. For them the
democratic dawn ushered in drastic setbacks in such realms as reproductive rights, access to
day care or employment opportunities. A revived civil society, which identifies men with the
public and women with the private sphere, further increased the masculinist character of
post-Wall German politics.87
Participation in voluntary civil society activity cannot, in and of itself, be
understood to empower and emancipate. ‘Discursively entrenched power relations’,
Bleiker writes, ‘cannot simply be toppled by mass demonstrations or other trans-
versal practices of dissent’.88 The ability to transgress political boundaries, to
organise transnationally and even to achieve democratic transformation, does not
necessarily and always challenge entrenched forms of domination and exclusion. It
may even deepen them. As Pasha and Blaney have it, ‘transnational associational life
does not so readily transcend contemporary contradictions and oppressions’.89 We
are not suggesting that there is no potential for a transformative GCS sphere, but
rather that it cannot be understood as unambiguously made by individual actors
rationally pooling their interests to secure the optimal outcome. Despite the claims
made about ‘social capital’, the political outcomes can never be clear-cut, and the
objectives may never be fully met. As is exemplified particularly well by women’s
movements in former Communist Europe, the achievement of apparent success in
political transformation can be built on the back of gendered practices that displace
risks onto women and migrant workers. The terms of reference of a civil society
movement for change cannot avoid dealing with the very exclusions it seeks to
oppose, and may indeed carry them into an otherwise transformed order.
Second, the assumption of GCS as a cohesive and empowered agent masks the
contradictions of people’s feelings of shared experience, personal wellbeing and
perceptions of risk and reward. Within existing conceptions of GCS, do we have
ways of thinking about the individual who is a member of Amnesty International
while simultaneously holding portfolio investments in a number of large
multinational corporations; the alliance between the United Nations World Food
Programme and Benetton’s advertising campaigns; the Visa cardholder who joins
Reclaim the Streets; or the report from the Seattle protests that asked: ‘did the
protester who was filmed kicking lumps off the Nike sign while wearing Nike shoes
see the irony?’.90 For it is in such contradictory relationships with the global political
economy that we all find ourselves. Arjun Appadurai captures just such a contra-
diction when he asks how we can begin to understand the disjuncture of:
Ideas about gender and modernity that circulate to create large female workforces at the same
time that cross-national ideologies of ‘culture’, ‘authenticity’, and national honour put
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increasing pressure on various communities to morally discipline just those working women
who are vital to emerging markets and manufacturing sites.91
It is these ‘dark sides’ of civil society activity that are so often invisible within
discourses of empowerment/resistance in global governance. Just as some move-
ments organise to challenge the boundaries that confine and restrict the movement
of people, images and ideas, for example, others campaign precisely to close them
down, to secure their own sense of belonging. There are currently, for example,
voluntary associations springing up in the English countryside to campaign against
planned asylum accommodation centres. Such groups make appeals to the threat to
their own community in order to exclude migrant peoples, with one group arguing
that their proximity to a prison and an army base means that they are already
subject to ‘outside’ threats. Indeed, even within a single protest we find some groups
securing their own identity by criminalising others, for example consumer activist
campaigners on the steps of Niketown in Seattle assisting the police in the
identification and arrest of anarchists.92 In these instances the empowerment of civil
society associations is pursued through the disempowerment of others, and the
identity of a collective body is secured through the production of insecurity for
others.
Finally, and a related point, we wish to emphasise again the unsettled and
contested nature of an emergent GCS. As William Connolly has argued, ‘a
conventional pluralist celebrates diversity within settled contexts of conflict and
collective action’.93 To borrow his framing of the problem, it is our view that the
conventional theorist of GCS celebrates diversity and difference within settled,
defined and clearly delimited boundaries. In contrast, we ask how these boundaries
come to be settled and contribute to what we would describe as GCS as a means of
governing. It is the very mapping and contesting of the boundaries of GCS that we
feel should receive greater attention in GCS research. To illustrate our point we will
draw on Naomi Klein’s ‘anti-corporate’ movement because it looms large in the
public imagination of what it means to be resisting the forces of globalisation.
Established through Klein’s columns in Toronto’s The Globe and Mail and her
first book No Logo, the no logo campaigns have seemed to be the epitome of an
open, mobile and multi-issue movement.94 Indeed, Klein herself notes that, ‘rather
than a single movement, what is emerging is thousands of movements intricately
linked to one another, much as “hotlinks” connect their websites on the Internet’.95
Yet, Klein is also keen to settle the common context within which these movements
operate, arguing that they are ‘not demonstrations of one movement but conver-
gences of many smaller ones’. The grounds for convergence are established as a
common foe, an identifiable set of forces that all participants are ‘against’. ‘Look a
little closer’, she tells us, ‘and it’s clear that these smaller, targeted movements are
Ambiguities of global civil society 107
91 Appadurai, ‘Grassroots Globalization’, p. 6.
92 Drainville, ‘Quebec City’, p. 31.
93 William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1995), p. xiii.
94 Naomi Klein, No Logo (London: Flamingo, 2000).
95 Naomi Klein, ‘Farewell to the “End of History”: Organization and Vision in Anti-Corporate
Movements’, Socialist Register (2002), p. 4.
indeed battling the same forces’.96 It seems that Klein does, after all, wish to
establish a settled context for the conflicts of diverse movements. A close study of
her website indicates a much more fiercely contested terrain on which the grounds
for collective action are fought out.97 As a self-proclaimed ‘critic both of the Israeli
occupation and of corporate-dictated globalization’, Klein states that ‘the globaliz-
ation movement isn’t anti-Semitic, it just hasn’t fully confronted the implications of
diving into the Middle East conflict’.98 Again, there is an attempt to find some
‘convergence’, this time between the Israeli occupation and the actions of MNCs,
and Klein finds the answer in ‘self-determination: the right of people everywhere to
decide how best to organize their societies and economies’. The potential diversity of
GCS’s political struggles is squeezed into a mould that conforms with the settled
view of how things should be.
For us, Klein’s desire to define the grounds for the movement’s position, amidst a
storm of protest in the chat room that followed, demonstrates exactly what Klein
seems to deny: the contested nature of GCS as a platform for diverse political
struggles. It is the perpetual struggle to define the terms of the movements that, in
large part, constitutes the politics of GCS. As the anti-corporate movement again
redefines its purpose with the inclusion of ‘solidarity with refugees’, rather than look
for a convergence or a ‘common threat’, we point to this as the essence of GCS
movements – the constant metamorphosis, fracturing, and dissent. Just as Klein
seeks to respond to state and corporate attempts to govern the parameters of her
movement, so she herself attempts to establish the governmental grounds for the
future legitimacy of that movement.
Concluding remarks
We began this article by commenting on the relationship between academic discus-
sions about what GCS might be and the challenges posed by ‘real’ world events. It is
not that September 11th represents an unprecedented watershed in IR, but rather
that it is one instance among many of a provocation to our dominant modes of
knowledge. Our approaches to understanding GCS will cast light on some of the
dynamics of contemporary world politics, while they leave others in deep shadow. In
this way the discourse of GCS constrains and delimits the possibilities for the
discussion and practice of global politics. For Mary Kaldor, for example, ‘the
attacks on September 11th can be understood as an attack on the basic assumptions
of global civility’.99 Yet, presumably they can also be understood as the result of the
failure of that ‘global civility’ to consider those who are excluded or positioned
outside its terms. Responses to September 11th in the form of the ‘war on terror’
have come to rely precisely upon the maintenance of such binaries as good/evil,
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civilised/uncivilised, legitimate/illegitimate politics.100 Yet, to look beyond these
binaries is to see that the lines cannot be drawn so easily. The police storming of the
London Finsbury Park mosque in 2003, for example, has revealed that a space of
religious, civil, and voluntary association embodies multiple and apparently contra-
dictory social and political practices. Similarly, in January 2002, the first female
Palestinian ‘suicide bomber’ was revealed to be a 28 year-old paramedic volunteer-
ing for the Red Crescent. A final example of the contradictory practices of GCS is
offered by Marieke de Goede who argues that attempts by the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) to close down terrorist finances runs up against multiple uses of
‘underground’ Hawala finance – including by development groups and migrant
workers.101 The question then becomes whether we wish to sustain assumptions
about legitimate, civil and emancipatory politics on the one hand, and illegitimate,
uncivil and extremist politics on the other, or whether we wish to enquire into their
simultaneous presence, their contradictions and tensions.
At one level, then, constraints are imposed on critical enquiry by the specific
neoliberal representations of responsible and civil subjects, such as those furthered
by the major international organisations. We would characterise such a represent-
ation of civil society as part of a neoliberal means of governing that disciplines and
excludes those who do not conform. It has been the portrayal of GCS as a bounded
space of ‘non-government’, common to the international organisations and some
academic commentaries, that has tended to obscure the very ‘governing’ qualities of
GCS to date. Yet, to an extent, critical academic accounts of GCS that focus their
attention on the capacity of social movements to counter neoliberal globalisation
also neglect to recognise the consequences of their reading for global politics. Whilst
the emancipatory potential of GCS is celebrated, the manner in which this assumed
transformative capacity is itself open to challenge and contradiction is not explored.
In our view, to continue the search for a particular kind of responsible, legitimate
and civil global agency is to avert our gaze from the power relations and con-
testation that lie at the heart of a politicised reading of GCS.
So, what would a more politicised GCS research agenda look like? For us it would
be wary of the search for a consolidated GCS, and would treat with caution claims
to a fully fleshed-out map of contemporary GCS. Rather, it would attend to the
modes of knowledge, dominant discourses and practices that have brought GCS
into common currency. To refuse to definitively pin down GCS, and to focus instead
on what is done in its name, is also to foreground the interplay between our theories
and concepts and empirical research. Better understanding is needed, not only of
how the GCS discourse is produced and operates concretely across and within
particular institutional settings (such as international organisations and NGOs), but
also of how it is translated and redefined at the level of situated experience. It is in
the everyday realms of familial, associational, religious or cultural life, for example,
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that GCS receives its concrete context. We suggest that it is here that the sketch
maps of multiple GCSs are being drawn and redrawn, and here where the power
relations, tensions and contradictions are being played out.
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